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Abstract 
Does foreign aid contribute to economic growth? If so, is the impact of aid 
conditional on good policies? This is a controversial issue. While the World Bank 
(1998) contends that the aid is effective only if recipient governments have good 
policies, others refute this view and argue that aid enhances economic growth 
regardless of the type of policies. This paper proposes new measures of policy that are 
more directly controlled by recipient governments. Using data from the World Bank, 
five panels of four-years covering the period 1974-1993 for 56 aid-receiving 
developing countries examine whether any significant relationship exists between 
foreign aid, government policies and economic growth. It is revealed that foreign aid 
has a positive impact on real growth per capita and this effect is not contingent upon 
the type of economic policies adopted by the recipient countries. It is also revealed 
that the log of the initial level of income is statistically significant, thus indicating 
conditional convergence among the countries in the sample, which contradicts the 
general findings of previous studies.  
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oes foreign aid contribute to economic growth?  If so, is the impact of aid 
conditional on good policies?  This has been a controversial issue.  While 
Burnside and Dollar (1997 and 2000), and the World Bank (1998) contend that the impact 
of aid is effective only if governments have good policies, others refute this view and argue 
that aid enhances economic growth regardless of the type of policies.1  
D 
Traditionally foreign financial aid has been viewed as a significant incentive for 
development however this view has always been controversial.  The debate on the effects 
of financial aid on growth can only be resolved with empirical evidence.  The experience of 
                                                 
1 Initially the World Bank  (1998) maintained that foreign aid assists to increase economic growth in countries 
with good economic management and it was a message to all donors that aid should be allocated to recipient 
countries in line with their policy conditions.  Since then World Bank report and Burnside and Dollar (1997, 
2000) viewpoints about effectiveness of aid and policy conditions have come under substantial evaluation 
(critique) by Lensink and White (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hermes and 
Lensink (2001), Hoeven (2001), Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) and Easterly (2003). 
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many developing countries could reveal that effective foreign aid should bring a package of 
finance and good ideas, and that a proper combination of these two is important for 
economic development.  Experience with a number of developing countries, shows that 
there needs to be better macroeconomic management and established institutions for 
effective use of foreign financial aid.  Studies by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) and 
Collier and Dollar (2001) found that foreign financial aid can raise economic growth and 
reduce poverty in the long run but only under a good policy environment.  
A key study challenging this view is Hansen and Tarp (2001).  The principal contribution 
of this research is to construct a different policy index variable (from that used by the 
extant literature) that may be more appropriate in measuring the effectiveness of foreign 
aid.  That is why a new macroeconomic policy index containing the policy measures that 
recipient governments can directly control has been introduced.  Using data from the 
World Bank (1998), five panels of four years covering the periods 1974-1977 to 1990-1993 
for 56 aid-receiving developing countries examine whether any significant relationship 
exists between foreign aid, government policies and economic growth.  
As in Hansen and Tarp (2000) unobserved country specific effects and an endogeneity of 
aid (using the instrumental variables) are taken into account in the estimated model. The 
estimation strategy involved econometric techniques including the ordinary least square 
(pooled OLS) model, fixed-effects (FE) model, random-effects (RE) model, FE within 
instrument variables (IV) model, two stage least square (2SLS) model estimator and GMM 
(Generalised Method of Moments) using the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panels 
model.  
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A key finding of this research is that the aid-policy interaction parameter, which was 
statistically significant in Burnside and Dollar (2000), is no longer a significant determinant 
even in countries with sound policy environments.  However, the interaction of (Aid)2 with 
Policy is positive and statistically significant in most cases, indicating the presence of scale 
effects of aid.  The coefficient of the Aid/GDP ratio is statistically significant and has 
positive coefficient parameters in almost all estimated regressions. An additional key 
finding is that the log of the initial level of income is statistically significant, thus indicating 
conditional convergence among the countries in the sample. Overall our regression results 
are more efficient than those in other studies.  
This addresses three key questions:  (a) Does foreign financial aid contributes to economic 
growth?  (b) Is the impact of financial aid conditional on the policy setting? and  (c) Is 
there a conditional convergence among the countries in the sample? 
The plan of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and 
provides a literature review of recent aid-policy-growth empirical studies.  Section 3 reviews 
the issue of the construction of the policy index.  Section 4 sets out the model and lists the 
data sources.2  Section 5 discusses the results and their broader implications.  Finally, 
section 6 concludes.     
2  Theoretical Background and Literature Review  
According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of  
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) foreign financial aid consists of grants, 
concessional loans and net of previous aid loans - a measure that absolves of past loans as 
                                                 
2 Country statistical summaries of explanatory variables are given in the Appendix. 
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current aid.  This measure of foreign aid is called net Official Development Assistance 
(ODA).  Foreign aid is usually associated with ODA and is targeted toward countries with 
low per capita income (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 Partial scatters of initial GDP per capita against foreign aid.  
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Note: Countries with low per capita income have received more foreign aid and vice versa.  
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
 
Regardless of the recent trend of large private capital inflow to developing countries, 
foreign aid remains an important source of external capital to lower income countries.  In 
some cases this amount is about eight per cent of Gross Domestic Product (World Bank, 
1998). 
Foreign financial aid could have positive as well as negative affects.  Financial aid enlarges 
domestic resources, promotes growth and structural transformation, helps to overcome 
balance of payments deficit, improves human capital and exports, expands markets, helps 
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policy reforms and establishment of quality institutions and overall macroeconomic 
management of a country.  Thus foreign aid can help to bring about long-term growth and 
poverty alleviation.  On the other hand foreign aid may reduce domestic savings, introduce 
inappropriate technology, and increase debt burden, creating a booming sector and Dutch 
disease effect on other sectors and crowding out private investment.  Aid can also assist the 
donor to pursue its political and economic interests in the recipient country. 
Many developing countries have received substantial foreign aid but have shown both 
success and failure in terms of growth and poverty reduction.  For example, Botswana and 
the republic of Korea have gone through crisis to rapid economic development. Foreign 
aid played a significant role in each transformation, contributing ideas, to support 
agricultural reforms and restructure of public service.  Therefore financial aid has changed 
the lives of millions of the poor in low-income countries.  On the other hand, in countries 
such as Zaire, Zambia, Nicaragua, and Malawi decades of large scale foreign assistance has 
resulted in failure (World Bank, 1998).  Table 12a and 12b in Appendix depicted country-
summary statistics (main indicators) of effectiveness of foreign financial aid. 
Thus there is substantial debate on the effect of foreign financial aid on economic growth.  
In an early survey, Mosely (1980) presented a historical review of the related literature and 
found that foreign aid stimulates economic growth.  However, Vos (1988) showed that 
foreign aid has depressed the growth of recipient countries.  Eaton (1989) showed that the 
effect of foreign aid on savings depends on the pattern of its disbursement.  Disbursement 
across older generations decreases savings and disbursement among younger generations 
increases savings.  While Hansen and Tarp (2000) in a review of the literature on the aid-
savings relationship found that aid leads to an increase in savings, but not as much as aid 
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flow.  Further, Gyimah-Brempong (1992), Potiowsky and Qayum (1992) and White (1992) 
found no clear evidence of the impact of foreign aid on growth of recipient countries.  But 
the comprehensive literature survey by Hansen and Tarp (2000) of three generations of 
empirical aid-growth study, including the Harrod-Domar models, the reduced form models 
of aid-growth, and the new growth theory models concluded that a positive relationship 
exists between aid and growth.  
Boone (1996) used infant mortality as an indicator of the impact of aid on the poor in less 
developed countries.  He argued that aid did not reduce infant mortality rate significantly, 
which indicates that the poor receive little benefit from it.  In contrast Burnside and Dollar 
(1997) found that aid helps reduce infant mortality.  If a country has good management, an 
extra one per cent of GDP in aid leads to a decline in infant mortality by about 0.9 per 
cent.  However the impact is marginal in countries with poor management. Collier and 
Dollar (2001) incorporate changes in poverty into their analysis to model the impact of aid 
on poverty.3  Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998), found that foreign aid can reduce 
poverty: on average a one per cent increase in per capita income reduces poverty by two 
per cent.  In a country with good management an increase in aid to the extent of one per 
cent of GDP results in a 0.5 per cent increase in growth of real GDP per capita and a one 
per cent decline in the poverty head count ratio.  Along similar lines Lensink and White 
(1999) argued that foreign aid could affect poverty through channels other than economic 
growth such as capacity building or improvement, which are not necessarily measurable.  
                                                 
3 Collier and Dehn (2001), in their paper, “Aid, shocks, and growth” argued that such allocation corresponds 
with the marginal efficiency of aid in reducing poverty across recipient countries and aid receipt is dependent 
on the level of poverty and the level of policy. 
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Burnside and Dollar (1997) have argued for incorporating the effects of structural 
adjustment policies, fiscal discipline and trade liberalisation in an analysis of the effects of 
aid on growth.  Their study provides two important lessons.  First if the aid recipient 
country can pursue sound economic policies, then aid can promote growth and reduce 
poverty in the long run.  Second, they argue that the recent tendency of lower income 
countries toward undertaking economic reforms has created a better environment for 
ensuring appropriate use of foreign financial aid.  
More recently, policy settings were added to the debate on the linkage between foreign aid 
and economic growth.  Two competing views have emerged.  On one hand, Burnside and 
Dollar (1997) and the World Bank (1998) contend that foreign aid contributes to economic 
growth effectively in a good policy environment, while it has had no measurable effect in 
countries with poor policies.   Burnside and Dollar (1997: 4) say, for example: ‘foreign aid 
accelerates growth and poverty reduction in developing countries that pursue sound 
economic policies.  It has had no measurable effect in countries with poor policies’.  The 
World Bank (1998: 2, 14), stressed almost identically: ‘financial aid works in a good policy 
environment… aid has a large effect when countries have sound management … policies 
have a critical influence on the effectiveness of aid’.  The main point is that foreign aid has 
a substantial positive effect on countries that pursue good policies, but has a negative effect 
in countries with bad policies.  Their argument is that foreign aid should be reallocated in 
favor of poor countries with good policies. 
Contrary to the World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) argument, some of 
the empirical literature suggests that there is indeed a positive relationship between foreign 
aid and economic growth, and that this is largely independent of the policy environment.  
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Good policy does enhance growth, but is not a necessary condition for aid to be effective.  
The main results in this context are those of Durbarry et al. (1998), Hadjimichael et al. 
(1995), and Hansen and Tarp (2001) who all find a significant impact of foreign aid on 
economic growth, as long as the foreign aid to GDP ratio is not enormously high. 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) contend that there is a robust aid-growth link even in countries 
hampered by an unfavorable policy environment.  They argue that much is still not known 
about the complex links between foreign aid, policies and economic growth and critique 
the Burnside and Dollar (2000) and World Bank (1998) studies by pointing out that their 
results were sensitive to data and model specification, and most notably, the critical aid-
policy interaction depended only on five observations and expansion of the sample by two 
per cent.  In addition, a foreign aid variable was tested only in its interaction with policy.  It 
was not quadratic, which is a rule of thumb in many empirical studies.  Hansen and Tarp 
(2001) therefore, added quadratic aid and quadratic policy in order to re-evaluate Burnside 
and Dollar’s (2000) findings, which were consequently nullified.  The issue of which 
policies should be included in the policy index also added a critical edge to the debate, 
understanding the importance of endogeneity and exogeniety of policy variables.  
A critical review of aid policies also reveals that the resources available to donors have 
constantly diminished since the 1980s, providing an impetus to the debate to evolve 
further.  From the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
donor countries and agencies increasingly focused on the responsibility of recipient 
countries in sharing the cost of development.  A paradigm shift in foreign aid in the 1990s, 
is evident in the key initiatives such as the New Development Strategy of the OECD/DAC 
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(1998) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper initiatives of the World Bank (2001).  In both 
documents, the agenda of donor countries and agencies is couched in such phrases as 
partnership with and ownership of recipient countries in the process of development 
(JICA, 1998; World Bank, 2001).   In addition, factors such as good governance, 
democracy and civil society that were previously regarded as political issues were 
increasingly mentioned as conditions facilitating economic growth consequent upon a 
program of foreign aid. 
Irrespective of what perspective one holds, this debate, clearly, has left many unresolved 
questions both theoretical and empirical.  
3   Construction of the Policy Index 
The extant studies, which examined the linkage between aid, policy and growth, used the 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) policy index.  This included: the budget surplus share of GDP, 
inflation rate, and trade openness.  A combination of these was defined as a policy index 
and expressed in the following equation.4  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }. . inf , (1Policy f bud surp lation openness aβ β β= + + )  
( ) ( ) ( )1.28 6.85 . 1.4 inf 2.16 , (1 )Policy bud surp lation openness b= + − +  
This study argues that the use of this policy index, especially its inclusion of inflation as a 
direct policy indicator, is inappropriate.  Before deciding which policy variable should form 
the policy index, a qualification is necessary.  While many types of selection are possible, 
the present study emphasises controllability by the government.  For example, no 
                                                 
4 For clarity Burnside and Dollar (2000) decided that it is better to have one measure of policy variables than 
three separate policy variables. They thought that the main aspect of their policy index is that it loads the policy 
variables in line with their correlation with growth. 
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government or central bank can directly control inflation rates unless it follows a successful 
inflation- targeting program.  Most developing countries do not.  However, they can better 
manage narrow money supply (M1) growth, which influences inflation rates.  Hence, 
narrow money is a better indicator of policy than inflation.  Inflation should be considered 
more as an outcome of a policy than a policy itself.  This is also the case for budget 
surplus.  In terms of the ‘openness’ variable they used Sachs-Warner’s (1995) measure of 
openness as a dummy variable, which has been criticised by Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000) 
for being biased and not relevant in classifying the type of economy (for example, a closed 
economy or a socialist one). 
In this research, the sum of annual weights of narrow money (annual growth), tax revenue 
(share of GDP), total public expenditure (share of GDP) and trade openness are used as an 
alternative policy index as follows: 
( )1 , (2TR Exp dMPolicy f Openness a
GDP GDP dt
β β β β⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭ )  
( )2 , (2TR Exp dMPolicy f Openness b
GDP GDP dt
β β β β⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭ )  
In equation (2a), the ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
dt
dM1  reflects narrow money growth and in (2b), the ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
dt
dM 2  
reflects broad money growth.  Almost all developing countries use these indicators for 
monetary management rate; the tax revenue share of GDP (TaxRev/GDP) means that 
high tax revenue collection for the government is a greater fiscal control of the recipient 
government; the public expenditure share of GDP implies the government spending level, 
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which could be spent for effective purposes and (openness)5 is a sum of country levels of 
exports and imports as a share of GDP, which indicates a country degree of trade 
openness.  All these policy variables are within government control.  Replacing the model 
with a set of actual policy variables could be helpful in illuminating the debate on aid 
effectiveness.    
4   Methodology, Data and Model Specification 
The model used for the empirical analysis to estimate the relationship between foreign aid, 
good policy settings and economic growth reported in this research is specified as follows.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 2 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 , (3)it i it it it z t itit it it ity Aid Aid Aid Aid uβ β β β β β β β β λΔΥ = + + +Ρ + ∗Ρ + + ∗Ρ +Ρ +Ζ + +
Where  
          YΔ it - is the average annual rate of growth of real GDP per capita, 
           yi0 - is the real GDP per capita in the initial year, 
           (Aid)it - is the foreign aid receipts relative to GDP, 
           Pit  - is the P x 1 vector of policies that affect growth, 
           Zit - is the K x 1 vector of other exogenous variables that might  
                affect growth and the allocation of aid, 
          λt  - is the constant term that may change over time or an intercept dummy  
               that takes the value one for period t and 0 otherwise, and 
          uit - is the error term 
           i and t index country and time respectively.     
Equation (3) is the same as the empirical model used by Burnside and Dollar (1997 and 
2000) and Hansen and Tarp (2001).  I use this model as well as their sample and data and 
examine whether the coefficient of (Aid*Policy) is strongly significant (as Burnside and 
                                                 
5 Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) argue that weak terms of trade have negative consequences for the growth 
rate.  
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Dollar found) or not (as Hansen and Tarp found).  However, we propose the new policy 
variable (2), which is different from their policy measures, equation (1).  Following Knack 
and Keefer (1995), Easterly and Levine (1997), Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000), World 
Bank (1998), Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Easterly et al. (2003), I also include a subset of 
the (K x 1) vector of exogenous variables (Zit), which are not affected by the level of 
foreign aid or growth rate in the aid-growth equation.  These variables (such as a measure 
of institutional quality and ethnolinguistic fractionalisation) include the different 
institutional and political factors that might affect economic growth.  Knack and Keefer 
(1995) indicated that an institutional quality comprises security of property rights and 
efficiency of government bureaucracy.  Another variable, which does not change much 
over time is an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization for the year of 1960 and has been 
used by Easterly and Levine (1997).  This indicator is correlated with poor policies and 
poor growth performance.  The “assassination” variable is used, since this has been used 
by several studies in order to involve civil discontent, and an interaction between ethnic 
fractionalisation with assassinations (Burnside and Dollar, 1997).  Table 2 (in Appendix) 
shows statistical summaries of explanatory variables, which are used in this study.  
Following Burnside and Dollar (2000), regional dummy variables for East Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa are also used.  Furthermore I introduced a time period dummy variables, to 
capture time-variant effects across all the aid-recipient countries.    
The data set covering the five four-year periods from 1974-1993 for 56 aid-receiving 
countries is used (see Table 1 in Appendix 1). Data on the new index of policy variables is 
obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2001).  The foreign aid variable 
covering aid flows originates from the OECD/DAC countries.  As some data are missing 
for some countries, because they are either not available or not disclosed, the total number 
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of observations is reduced.  Panel data are used with observations on countries over time 
periods.  The error term can be expressed: Uit=μi+εit, where μi is a time invariant country 
specific effect (parameter) and εit is random noise (error).  
The Breusch-Pagan test (a test of variance of individual effects equal to zero) is used to 
confirm the presence of country specific effects.  The Hausman test is used to choose 
between fixed-effect and random effect specifications (the result of tests shown in 
Appendix). 
Following Hansen and Tarp (2000), foreign aid is assumed to be endogenous.  However 
the policy variable is not treated as endogenous in all regressions because many individual 
policy variables are not correlated with the initial level of GDP per capita.  By using 
Hausman’s (1979) test for endogeneity (see also Wooldridge (2002)) the reduced form is 
estimated for endogenous variables and regressions (tests) are run to check whether the 
instrument variables correlate with endogenous variables.  The set of (ten) instruments are 
uses to improve efficiency for the endogenous regressors.  Regressions are estimated on 
pooled OLS, FE, RE, FE (within) Instrumental Variables, 2SLS and the GMM of Dynamic 
Panels Model.6
 The estimators are consistent with different assumptions about the time invariant country 
specific effects (μi ).  All of the estimators assume that the idiosyncratic error term εit has a 
zero mean and is uncorrelated with the variables in Xit.  As in the case where there are no 
endogenous covariates, there are varying perspectives on what assumptions should be 
made about the (μi).  The time-invariant country specific effects may occur at fixed time or 
                                                 
6 An explanation, as to why some above estimators are inappropriate, is given during the discussion of results 
(see section 5). 
 14
randomly.  If they are assumed to be fixed, then the (μi ) may be correlated with the 
variables in Xit, and the “within” estimator is efficient within a class of limited information 
estimators. Now, consider a simple five-period model and rewrite (3) as: 
∑
=
− +++Χ++=ΔΥ
k
j
ititjitjitit dy
1
510 5 εμλβδβ   ,          (4) 
                              
Taking the mean over time of each variable will give 
     
 ∑
=
+++Χ++=ΥΔ
k
j
iijijii dy
1
50 5 εμλβδβ   ,             (5) 
                              
Subtracting (5) from (4) gives 
  
∑
=
++Χ+=ΔΥ
k
j
ijijii y
1
*
55
*
5
*
5
*
5 ελβδ   ,                             (6) 
OLS on the model (6) is called fixed effects estimation. The estimate of βj is also called the 
“within” estimate. 
Alternatively, the (μi ) may be random, in which case the (μi ) are assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed over the panels.  If the (μi ) are uncorrelated with 
the variables in Xit, then the GLS random effects estimators are more efficient than the 
within estimator (StataCorp., 2001).  However, both methods (FE (within) IV and random-
effects estimators) are used to find which method has the best properties (of consistency 
and efficiency) for the aid-policy-growth model. 
The instrument variable estimator for the dynamic panels introduced by Anderson and 
Hsiao (1981) generates consistent estimates for our parameters in (3). Therefore 
alternatively to the fixed effects estimator model, differencing all the data could eliminate 
 15
the country specific effects. To remove the entire specific unobserved effects, first write (3) 
as:7
∑
=
− ++Χ++=ΔΥ
k
j
ittjitjitit uy
1
10 λβδβ   ,                        (7) 
                            
Upon differencing equation (7) becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11
1
1,211 −−
=
−−−− −+−+Χ−Χ+−=ΔΥ−ΔΥ ∑ ititttk
j
tjijitjitititit yy εελλβδ   ,     (8)      
In (8) all the regressors are correlated with the error term.8  This problem is solved by 
introducing lagged observations of some regressors as instruments.9
Following StataCorp. (2001) the Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) dynamic panel 
model (Arellano and Bond, 1991)10 is used for the purpose of over-identifying restrictions 
(Sargan) test and finding conditional convergence of the log of initial level of income per 
capita.  The Sargan test is useful if the number of instrument variables is greater than the 
number of endogenous variables.  
Finally, following Burnside and Dollar (2000) the study estimates the impact of Aid on 
growth.  The aggregate production function form Y= AKλ is examined to see whether 
                                                 
7 Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) planned using further lags of the level of difference of the dependent 
variable to instrument the lagged dependent variables included in a dynamic panels model after random affects 
had been removed by first differencing. Following Hansen and Tarp (2001), here in equation (4) the YΔ it is the 
growth rate average, yit-1 is the log of the initial per capita GDP, Xjit are the n additional regressors. 
 
8 In equation (5) yit-1 is correlated with  εit-1  and also Xjit are correlated with   εit-1.
 
9 Follow Hansen and Tarp (2001), under the assumption that Xjit is predetermined Xji,t-1 is a solid instrument 
and  Xji,t-n is valid if Xji,t-1 is endogenous, as I have decided for Aid variables.  
 
10 Arellano and Bond (1991), using the GMM framework, which was developed by Hansen (1982) classified 
number lags of dependent variables and the predetermined variables as valid instruments and suggested how to 
join these lagged levels with first differences of the truly exogenous variables into a very large instrument 
matrix. Arellano and Bond (1991) obtained the corresponding one step and two step GMM estimators. They 
also derived a Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions for this estimator.   
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foreign financial aid affects output through its effect on the stock of capital (as 
investment).  The derivative of growth with respect to aid for all regressions is: 
FdF ∂ΚΑ=
−1λλd Κ∂Υ    ,                            (9) 
  
where dY indicates the increase in output effected by the contribution of aid.  ∂K/∂F is the 
portion of an additional unit of aid that is invested, and dF is the amount of aid 
contributed. 
Alternatively growth with respect to aid can be derived as: 
  ( ) ∑≠ Χ∗+Χ∗+=∂
Υ∂
kj
jikjkkkkAid
βββ 2   ,                    (10) 
where ⎯Xs are the means of explanatory variables used in the regressions.  
 
Time and regional dummy variables are included in almost all the regressions. Appendix 
lists are: aid-receiving countries, data series, test results, country summary statistics of main 
indicators and explanatory variables.  
5  Regressions, Results and Discussion 
First, following Burnside and Dollar (1997), equation (3) is estimated without including aid 
and policy index by using the simple pooled OLS model for an unbalanced panel of 56 aid 
receiving-countries across five-periods.  The results are presented in Appendix (Table 3, 
column 1) institutional quality (Government), openness, initial level of per capita GDP 
growth and the dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and for East Asia are generally significant 
in growth regression.  Aid is introduced in the regression column (2), where the differences 
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of changing explanatory variables and their impact in growth regression can be seen.  Aid is 
insignificant with a negative coefficient.  
 To build a policy index11, which consists of tax revenue, total public expenditure, terms of 
trade and annual growth of money indicators, regression coefficients are used from the first 
column of Table 3: 
( )06 1.0364 .00098 .00031 4.89 .00004 , (11 )TR Exp dMPolicy e Openness a
GDP GDP dt
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
Given the sizes (and signs) of the coefficients, it appears that TaxRev/GDP and Openness 
have large effects on the policy index, while the index of policy can be negative if (dM1/dt) 
or (Exp/GDP) are growing. 
In column (3) in Table 3, regression results were reported after using the new policy index.  
This index is significant and has a very large coefficient with a large t-statistic.  The new 
policy index is significantly correlated with economic growth, which suggests that the 
alternative measure of policy also affects the growth rate of real GDP per capita (Figure 2 
in Appendix). 
However the aid variable has a small positive coefficient, which is almost the same as in 
Burnside and Dollar (2000).  Now it is clear that almost all other variable coefficients, as in 
Table 3, are similar in terms of magnitude and significance across three regressions where 
individual and joint policy variables are used.  
                                                 
 
11 The alternative policy index including broad money supply indicator is stipulated in Appendix. 
     A similar practice has been followed by Burnside and Dollar (2000).  
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Given that a principal aim of this research is to examine whether or not the interaction of 
aid with policy is a significant determinant of growth, interaction of aid with policy and aid 
quadratic variables are included to estimate Fixed-Effects and Random-Effects models 
(explanation of using FE and RE models is given in the methodology and model 
specification section) and examine which model is more efficient and valid for the aid-
policy-growth regression.  The results of FE and RE models are given in Table 4 (in 
Appendix). 
Between the FE and RE results, the FE model is more efficient, although it is not 
consistent.  The coefficient of aid is positive and is statistically significant at five per cent 
for FE.  This coefficient is insignificant for the RE model.  The Policy index for both FE 
and RE models is significant and has large positive coefficients.  However the coefficients 
of interaction of Aid*Policy remain insignificant and have a negative sign. The coefficients 
of other variables are almost the same.  To ascertain which regression model (FE or RE) is 
a more efficient predictor the following two statistical tests, Bruesch-Pagan (1980) and 
Hausman (1978), are conducted (in Appendix).  The Hausman specification test is to 
choose either the fixed effects or random effects models.  Both tests reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the fixed effects estimation is better.  However, although the 
fixed effects model is efficient, it is inconsistent.  Hence instrument variables are used for 
both FE and RE models in the next regressions to see if there are endogeneity problems in 
our models.  Apart from using FE estimation to remove country specific effects, 
additionally, because some variables (explanatory) on the right of the equation (3) are 
endogenous, the reduced form was used to compare the OLS and 2SLS estimates and 
determine whether the differences are statistically significant (Wooldridge, 2000). 
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The OLS and RE differ significantly and it can be concluded that there must be 
endogenous variables.  Hence, for each suspected endogenous variable Aid, (Aid)2 and 
Aid*Policy a reduced form of residuals is obtained.  Then, the joint significance of these 
residuals is tested in the structural equation by using an F-test (Appendix).  
Instruments for the above three suspected endogenous variables are constructed and the 
Hausman test and the F-test are used to determine whether the instruments are correlated 
with the endogenous variables.  On this basis ten instrumental variables are isolated to 
proxy for the endogenous variables in the growth regression.  This model is also estimated 
using two stage least squares (2SLS) and the results are shown in Table 5 (Appendix).  
Table 5 also compares the results from 2SLS and FE (within instrument variables) 
estimation.  The FE model has more significant coefficients.  Aid*Policy is, however, 
insignificant in both, whereas Policy is significant in both.  Since the FE (within IV) model 
is more efficient (Wooldridge, 2000; StataCorp., 2001) it was preferred over the 2SLS 
model.  
The main results here are shown in Table 6 (Appendix) that reports results from the (more 
efficient) FE (within Instrumental Variables) estimation.  Two versions of the model are 
estimated with results in Columns 1 (a) and 2 (a) referring to the policy index with growth 
of M1 whereas results in columns 1 (b) and 2 (b) refer to estimation with the policy index 
incorporating M2. In columns 2 (a) and 2 (b) is used the additional variable (Aid)2*Policy 
(interaction of aid quadratic with policy index).  Aid*Govern is used throughout.   
The estimated results show that the interaction term Aid*Policy remains insignificant 
regardless of including new variables.  (Aid)2*Policy, Aid*Govern and (Aid)2*Govern are 
also not significant.  However, policy is significant and has the right sign.  Aid, by itself, is 
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significant only in column 1(a).   In each of these regressions the instrument variables are 
uncorrelated with the error term, which is shown by F-test p-value.  
Since the fixed effects estimation using instrumental variables is an overall inconsistent 
estimator an alternative method of estimation, the GMM dynamic panels of Arellano-Bond 
(1981), is used.  This provides consistent results and permits an estimation of the over-
identifying restrictions and level of conditional convergence of log of initial income per 
capita across all countries in the sample.  However GMM leads to loss of observations.12   
The results of the GMM estimation are reported in Table 7.  Here the results of the M1 
index of policy are reported (results using the M2 measures are given in Table 8, 
Appendix).  It is clear that the significance of Aid*Policy depends crucially on the list of 
variables included in the regression.  Aid*Policy is significant with a negative sign in only 
one regression.  However, in the same regression (Aid)2*Policy has a positive sign and is 
significant.  (Aid)2*Policy is insignificant in other equations.  Policy is significant except 
when (Policy)2 is included in the regression.  Aid*Govern is significant (with a negative 
sign) in the equations in which it appears.  
The GMM estimates are important since they are both consistent as well as efficient. The 
effect of aid in the GMM regressions depends upon the specification.  The coefficient of 
aid is significant when quadratic terms in aid and policy are used. 
 
                                                 
12 Arellano and Bond (1991) recommended using the one-step results for inference on the coefficients. A 
number of studies have found that the two-step standard error is biased downward in small samples. 
Therefore, the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-step result is only recommended only for inference. They found 
evidence that the one-step Sargan test over rejects in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
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  Table 7   The Arrelano-Bond dynamic panel model (GMM) regressions for  
                  aid-receiving countries 
Dep.var: Growth 
rate per capita 
GMM 
Regression 1 2 3 4 
 
lngdppc 
 
Aid 
 
(Aid)2
 
Aid*Policy 
 
Policy 
 
(Policy)2
 
(Aid)2*Policy 
 
Aid*Govern. 
 
(Aid)2*Govern. 
 
Assassin 
 
Ethnf*Assassin 
 
Fin.Dev. 
 
Number obs-n 
 
Sargan p-value 
 
 
-0.073(-3.67)* 
 
 0.024(0.15) 
 
-0.027(-0.13) 
 
-2.029(-0.47) 
 
1.009(2.38)** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.0042(-1.17) 
 
 0.0001(1.96)** 
 
-0.00024(-0.67) 
 
 163 
 
 0.47 
 
 
-0.078(-3.89)* 
 
 0.247(1.14) 
 
 0.112(0.48) 
 
 0.76(0.15) 
 
0.82(1.61)*** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.10(-1.67)*** 
 
- 
 
-0.004(-1.12) 
 
 0.0001(1.93)** 
 
-0.0003(-0.86) 
 
163 
 
 0.49 
 
 
-0.071(-3.58)* 
 
 0.60(1.96)** 
 
-1.66(-2.49)* 
 
-15.33(-1.97)** 
 
1.74(3.83)* 
 
- 
 
38.13(2.41)** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.004(-1.14) 
 
 0.0001(1.94)** 
 
-0.004(-1.14) 
 
163 
 
 0.44 
 
 
-0.0794(-3.89)* 
 
 1.107(2.08)** 
 
-2.05(-1.71)*** 
 
-8.59(-0.94) 
 
 1.014(1.54) 
 
10.54(1.18) 
 
26.66(1.10) 
 
-0.201(-1.76)*** 
 
 0.229(0.90) 
 
-0.0038(-1.03) 
 
 0.0001(1.85)*** 
 
-0.0003(-0.95) 
 
163 
 
 0.44 
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
An important result from the GMM estimation is that the coefficient of lagged per capita 
income is significant and negative in all versions of the model.  This is a strong result on 
convergence, which has not been reported in this literature so far. The GMM estimates are, 
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thus, consistent and efficient and indicate conditional convergence among the 56 countries 
in the sample.13
One aim of the GMM estimation is to find the number of overidentifying restrictions and 
their validity.  There are only three endogenous explanatory variables and ten new 
instrument variables in the aid-policy-growth model.  Using the xtabond and the two-step 
model computed results are for the Sargan test of Arrelano and Bond’s (1991) dynamic 
panels.14  Overall Sargan’s test results in Table 7 illustrate that the null hypothesis is no 
longer rejected and allow the conclusion that the over-identifying restrictions are valid.  
Test results also show that the signs of the estimated coefficients do not change.  An 
important problem with all the aid-policy growth regressions in Burnside and Dollar 
(2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001) and other related literature, is that they are not able to 
establish conditional convergence (even at 15 per cent or 20 per cent).  In this study since 
the log of initial level of income per capita is statistically significant in the GMM panel data 
estimated regression, there is a statistically significant conditional convergence among all 
the countries in the sample.  
Finally, using equation (10), the derivative of growth with respect to aid is used to present a 
straightforward interpretation of this empirical research. Results are given in Appendix       
(Table 9) and indicate that the OLS, the RE and the 2SLS coefficients for the effect of aid 
on growth are not significant.  However the FE, FE (within IV), and GMM methods show 
a significant effect on growth of aid when the variable (Aid)2*Policy is included.    
                                                 
13 Caselli et al., (1996) argued for and supported the use of GMM panel data measurement in conditional  
convergence analysis in the Solow-Swan augmented growth model. 
 
14  As our test results illustrate, the two-step Sargan test may be better for inference on model   specification as 
long we do not have a small sample. For more information see StataCorp., (2001). 
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In Table 10 (in Appendix) compared the robustness of Aid-Policy-Growth regressions 
across 56 aid receiving countries by using a different definition of Aid and alternative 
policy variables.  Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly et al., (2003) ignored country 
specific effects and therefore they used OLS and 2SLS estimator models, while Hansen and 
Tarp (2001) used, and the current study uses, the GMM estimator model because of 
country specific effects. 
The main reason for arriving at different results in GMM estimation (see Table 11) are: 
different panel data estimation techniques are used, including time period dummies and 
new variables; a different definition of aid and alternative policy measures; none of the 
chosen instrument variables are correlated with error terms.  One implication of this 
estimation is that the results are technique-specific.15  
   
                                                 
15 There, is also the possibility that changes in data could change results as noted by Sala-I-Martin and Barro 
(1995). 
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 Table 11   Differences between current study and others 
Data From 1974 to 1993, five four-year periods, the same 
as Hansen and Tarp’s (2001) study 
In order to remove the country specific effects and 
get efficiently consistent estimators the FE within 
Instrument Variables and Generalised Method of 
Moments are used in this study. While Burnside and 
Dollar (2000), Easterly et al., (2003) and others 
ignored the country specific effects and used OLS 
and 2SLS, Hansen and Tarp (2001) have used the 
GMM technique. 
Technique used  
Definition of Aid and 
Policy 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) used a new definition of 
aid, which includes only grants, however we have 
used the standard definition of aid, which is Official 
Development Assistance that includes loans and 
grants. This is the same as Hansen and Tarp (2001) 
and Easterly et al., (2003) and other studies.  
I use two new Policy indexes in this study, which are: 
Policy=TR/GDP+TE/GDP+dM1/dt+Openness 
Policy= TR/GDP+TE/GDP+dM2/dt+Openness 
 
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
In sum, the results of this study show that Aid/GDP ratio has a positive relationship with 
growth rate and is significant in the main regressions of GMM.  However, these results 
differ from other studies in the area of the importance of policy to aid effectiveness.  It has 
been shown that the parameter of interaction Aid*Policy which was an important 
determinant of the effectiveness of aid in Burnside and Dollar (1997) actually plays an 
insignificant role.  This result is in common with Hansen and Tarp (2001).  However, 
Hansen and Tarp do not analyses the role of (Aid)2*Policy.  In this estimation it turns out 
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to be a positive and significant determinant of the effectiveness of aid, in some, but not all 
cases.  So, if the policy environment is to have any impact on the effectiveness of aid, the 
quantum of aid should be large.  Hence, it can be concluded that the evidence in favor of 
the importance of the policy environment to the effectiveness of aid is, in general, weak.  
6  Conclusions  
Whether aid is effective and if this effectiveness is contingent upon good policy, are 
questions of profound importance for developing countries.  If the Burnside-Dollar thesis 
is accepted, one should not bemoan the recent drop in aid flows, especially in the face of 
poor policy performance by developing countries.  
The series of results by Hansen and Tarp (2001) questioned this wisdom and the present 
research extends this analysis in two important directions.  First, it questions the 
construction of the policy index used by extant authors and emphasises the need to include 
variables that are directly controllable by the government in the policy index, and to eschew 
using consequences of policy in the policy index.  Second, this study provides robust 
estimations of the effects of aid on economic growth and points out that some of the 
results of the extant literature could well be sensitive to data/model 
specification/technique of estimation.  
These results, with the new policy index, indicate that the relationship between policy and 
the effectiveness of aid is tenuous, at best.  Policy appears to be a relevant determinant of 
the effectiveness of aid only if such aid is forthcoming in large amounts.  Hence this paper 
emphasises, as a general proposition, the need to increase aid flows irrespective of the 
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policy environment in developing countries.  In specific instances, for example, large 
volumes of aid, this conclusion may need to be modified.  
Another important result of this research is the conditional convergence obtained across 
the countries in the sample.  This result is not possible with the old policy index.  Thus the 
need for appropriate specification and robust econometric estimation is underscored.  
Finally, the paper, by emphasising, the fragility of some of the results, underscores the need 
for further research in this area.  
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Appendix:  
 
Table 1  Data series 
Variable name Description Source 
Aid 
 
 
 
Growth 
 
 
Igdppc 
 
Assasin 
 
 
Financial 
development 
 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
 
Icrge 
 
 
M1/GDP  
 
M2/GDP 
 
TaxRev/GDP 
 
Trade Openness 
 
 
Exp/GDP 
 
Official development assistance as a share of 
GDP 
 
 
Average growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 
 
Initial level of real GDP per capita 
 
Number of assassinations  per 100,000 
population 
 
Lagged one period of M2 as a share of GDP 
 
 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, 1960 
 
 
Institutional quality; security of property rights 
and efficiency of the government bureaucracy 
 
M1 as a share of GDP 
 
M2 as a share of GDP 
 
Tax revenue as a share of GDP 
 
Sum of Exports and Imports  as a share of GDP 
 
 
Total Government Expenditure as a share of 
GDP 
 
OECD-DAC data as 
reported in Hansen  
and Tarp (2000). 
 
WDI (1998) 
 
 
WDI (1998) 
 
Easterly and Levine 
(1997) 
 
Burnside and Dollar  
(2000) 
 
Easterly and Levine 
(1997) 
 
Knack and Keefer 
(1995) 
 
WDI (1998) 
 
WDI (1998) 
 
WDI (1998) 
 
WDI (2001) 
 
 
WDI (1998) 
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
  
List of Sample Countries 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Algeria, Argentina*, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil*, Cameroon, Chile*, Colombia*, Costa Rica*, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El- Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon*, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guatemala*, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica*, Kenya, Korea Republic (South), 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia*, Mali, Mexico*, Morocco, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru*, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria*, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad & Tobago*, Tunisia, Turkey*, Uruguay, Venezuela*, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Note: An asterisk indicates the country is treated as a middle-income aid-recipient  
Source: Hansen and Tarp (2001).  
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Table 2  Statistical summaries of explanatory variables 
Variable  Obs.        Mean             Std. Dev.             Min                    Max 
 
Aid       
(Aid)2       
Aid*Policy  
Policy 
(Policy)2      
lgdppc      
Ethnf        
Assassin  
TaxRev/GDP 
Exp/GDP     
dM1/dt     
Openness  
Icrge        
Fin.Dev       
Ethnf*Assas 
 
  
 278       0.061313        0.086966          -0.0003               0.5391 
 278       0.011295        0.035536           0                         0.29063 
 278       0.009127        0.016066          -0.0000387         0.14132 
280       0.1345            0.0529                0.031                 0.44 
 280       0.020875        0.018524            0.000961           0.19625 
 278       6.601312        0.8995506          4.5455               8.6361 
 280     47.39286        30.16483              0                      93.0 
 280       0.423214        1.225621            0                      11.5 
 230     14.75961          6.630041            2.3                   40.46 
 236     21.58411        10.70313              3.42                 85.1 
 278     25.77827        14.94177              0                      85.57 
 279     55.30108        29.80231              0                    234.0 
 280       4.598357        1.216992            2.2708               7.0 
 276     30.16683        13.8984                8.9733             98.3865 
 280     16.30089        59.20763              0                    736.0  
 
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
 
 
  Table 3  Aid, Policies and Economic Growth: estimates for 56 aid-receiving 
                  countries, using individual and joint policy variables.16  
Dep. var: Growth                                        OLS 
Regression 1 2 3 
TR/GDP 
TE/GDP 
dM1/dt 
Openness 
Ethnf 
Assassin 
Ethnf*Assassin 
Icrge (Government) 
Fin.Dev. 
Initial GDP/capita 
East Asia 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Aid 
Policy index 
Degrees of freedom 
R2
 0.00098(1.48) 
-0.00031(-0.75) 
-4.89e-06(-3.09)* 
 0.00004(0.39) 
-0.00012(-1.14) 
-0.0028(-0.74) 
 0.00005(0.67) 
 0.0077(3.67)* 
-0.00008(-0.35) 
-0.0059(-1.77)*** 
 0.0235(2.86)* 
-0.0178(-2.41)** 
- 
- 
223 
0.35 
 0.001(1.47) 
-0.00029(-0.71) 
-4.37e-06(-2.48) 
 0.00001(0.09) 
-0.0001(-0.88) 
-0.003(-0.74) 
 0.00005(0.67) 
 0.0078(3.71)* 
-0.00001(-0.48) 
-0.0051(-1.30)* 
 0.0242(2.93)* 
-0.019(-2.39)** 
 0.0235(0.45) 
- 
222 
0.33 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.00005(-0.63) 
-0.003(-0.97) 
 0.00006(0.84) 
 0.0068(3.82)* 
-0.00004(-0.23) 
-0.0037(-1.22) 
 0.024(3.36)* 
-0.021(-3.25)* 
 0.0279(0.090) 
 0.962(3.92)* 
272 
0.34 
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, (**) at the 5% level and (***) at the 10% level. 
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Table 4  Aid, Policies and Economic Growth: estimates for 56 aid-receiving  
                 countries, panel data for 1974-1993 
 Dep. var: Growth FE RE 
Aid 
Policy 
Aid*Policy  
(Aid)2
Ethnf 
Assassin 
Ethnf*Assassin 
Fin.Dev. 
Govern. 
Initial GDP per capita 
Degrees of freedom 
Sigma_e 
p-value(F-test) 
 0.424(2.04)** 
 1.225(3.09)* 
-3.394(-0.92) 
-0.579(-2.06)** 
- 
-0.0069(-1.69)*** 
 0.00012(1.48) 
-0.00013(-0.45) 
- 
-0.0159(-1.02) 
217 
0.029 
0.035 
 0.138(0.90) 
 0.968(2.90)* 
-0.352(-0.11) 
-0.225(-1.33) 
-0.00007(-0.62) 
-0.0037(-1.17) 
 0.00007(1.06) 
-0.00007(-0.46) 
 0.07(3.72)* 
-0.0027(-0.78) 
221 
0.029 
- 
Note: All the regressions in Appendix 2 have time and regional dummies, not reported here.  
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
 
 
Table 5  Aid, Policies and Economic Growth: estimates for 56  
             aid-receiving countries, panel data for 1974-1993 
Regression FE(within) InVar 2SLS 
 
Aid 
(Aid)2
Aid*Policy 
Policy 
Ethnf 
Assassin 
Ethnf*Assassin 
Fin.Dev. 
Govern. 
Initial GDP per capita 
SSA 
Easia 
N observ-n 
Sigma_e 
 
 0.666(2.00)** 
-1.34(-2.36)** 
-1.115(-0.18) 
 1.07(2.20)** 
- 
-0.0079(-1.87)*** 
 0.0014(1.61)*** 
-0.00012(-0.039) 
- 
0.0019(0.08) 
- 
- 
271 
0.030 
 
 
 0.191(0.79) 
-3.98(-1.19) 
-1.35(-0.31) 
 1.011(2.55)* 
-0.0001(-1.01) 
-0.043(-1.31) 
 0.00008(1.19) 
-0.00007(-0.39) 
 0.0073(3.35)* 
-0.0045(-1.07) 
-0.002(-2.39)** 
 0.026(2.92)* 
271 
 0.030 
Note: Instrumented variables are Aid, (Aid)2  and Aid*Policy. 
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
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Table 6   Aid, Policies and Economic Growth: estimates for 56 aid-receiving  
                   countries, panel data for 1974-1993 
Dep. var: Growth FE within instrument variables 
Regression 1(a) 1(b) 2(a) 2(b) 
Aid 
 
(Aid)2
 
Policy 
 
Aid*Policy 
 
Aid*Govern 
 
(Aid)2*Policy 
 
(Aid)2*Govern. 
 
Assassin 
 
Ethnf*Assassin 
 
Fin.Dev. 
 
Initial GDP per 
capita 
  
N- observation 
 
Sigma_e 
 
F-test p-value 
 
0.712(1.92)*** 
 
-1.30(-2.30)* 
 
1.08(2.54)* 
 
-1.023(-0.24) 
 
-0.016(-0.28) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.008(-1.9)*** 
 
 0.00014(1.61) 
 
-0.00014(-0.46) 
 
  
0.0007(0.04) 
 
271 
 
 0.0296 
  
0.065 
 
0.77(1.39) 
 
-1.52(-2.37)** 
 
1.65(3.62)* 
 
0.0973(1.60) 
 
-0.024(-0.23) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.0067(-1.60) 
 
0.00012(1.40) 
 
-0.0005(-1.28) 
 
 
0.00025(0.01) 
 
271 
 
0.0292 
 
0.007 
 
1.76(1.58) 
 
-4.14(-1.45) 
 
1.44(2.19)** 
 
-9.26(-0.66) 
 
-0.26(-1.07) 
 
32.17(0.76) 
 
0.53(0.86) 
 
-0.007(-1.7)*** 
 
0.00013(1.52) 
 
-0.0002(-0.67) 
 
 
-0.020(-1.25) 
 
271 
 
0.0292 
 
0.068 
 
2.68(1.40) 
 
-5.24(-1.18) 
 
1.68(3.59)* 
 
-0.17(-0.14) 
 
-0.502(-1.22) 
 
4.86(0.93) 
 
0.94(0.96) 
 
-0.0069(-1.60) 
 
0.00013(1.43) 
 
-0.0006(-1.49) 
 
 
-0.0085(-0.48) 
 
271 
 
0.0297 
 
0.019 
 
Note: Instruments used:  Arms imports(t-1); Policy(t-1); (Policy)2(t-1); Aid(t-1); (Aid)2(t-1);  
    Policy*Aid(t-1); Policy*(Aid)2(t-1);  Policy*Initial GDP per capita; Policy*(Initial GDP per capita)2 and  
    Policy*ln(Population). 
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
 
 
Alternative Policy Index: 
The alternative policy index includes policy measures such as money growth (dM2/dt), tax revenue 
(share of GDP), total expenditure (share of GDP) and trade openness. 
( )07 2.0392 .00107 .0005 9.86 .000085 , (11 )TR Exp dMPolicy e Openness b
GDP GDP dt
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
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  Table 8  The Arrelano-Bond dynamic panel model (GMM) regressions for 
                    aid-receiving countries (using alternative policy index, (11b)) 
Dep. var: 
Growth rate 
per capita 
 
GMM 
Regression 1 2 3 4 
 
Lngdppc 
 
Aid 
 
(Aid)2
 
(Aid)*Policy 
 
Policy 
 
(Policy)2
 
(Aid)2*Policy 
 
Aid*Govern. 
 
(Aid)2*Govern. 
 
Assassin 
 
Ethnf*Assassin 
 
Fin.Dev. 
 
Number obs-n 
Sargan p-value 
 
 
-0.068(-3.44)* 
 
 0.0026(0.02) 
 
-0.124(-0.39) 
 
 0.452(1.06) 
 
 2.19(4.06)* 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.004(-1.11) 
 
 0.0001(1.85)*** 
 
-0.0005(-1.8)*** 
 
 163 
 0.39 
 
 
-0.068(-3.45)* 
 
-0.012(-0.08) 
 
-0.09(-0.30) 
 
 0.38(0.97) 
 
 2.18(4.05)* 
 
-0.104(-0.55) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.004(-1.11) 
 
 0.0001(1.85)*** 
 
-0.0006(-2.07)** 
 
163 
 0.39 
 
 
-0.068(-3.46)* 
 
 0.036(0.21) 
 
-0.216(-0.60) 
 
-0.14(-0.17) 
 
 2.18(4.03)* 
 
- 
 
 2.41(0.96) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.004(-1.21) 
 
 0.0001(1.9)** 
 
-0.0004(-1.43) 
 
163 
 0.32 
 
 
-0.071(-3.53)* 
 
 0.36(0.64) 
 
 0.39(0.28) 
 
-0.52(-0.58) 
 
 2.03(3.70)* 
 
- 
 
 4.96(1.65)*** 
 
-0.106(-0.90) 
 
-0.1001(-0.36) 
 
-0.004(-1.13) 
 
 0.0001(1.88)*** 
 
-0.0006(-1.8)*** 
 
163 
 0.41 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level 
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
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Table 9   The impact of aid on growth for 56 aid receiving countries 
Regression/Table Method dY/dAid  
(1.3) / Table 3 
(2.1) / Table 4 
(2.2) / Table 4 
(3.1) / Table 5 
(3.2) / Table 5 
(2.1a) / Table 6 
(2.2a) / Table 6 
 (3.1) / Table 7 
(3.2) / Table 7 
(3.3) / Table 7 
(3.4) / Table 7 
OLS 
FE 
RE 
FE (within I.V.) 
2SLS 
FE(within IV) 
- 
GMM 
- 
- 
- 
 0.028 (0.09) 
 0.214(2.04)** 
 0.098(0.90) 
 0.47(2.01)** 
-0.34(-0.78) 
 0.51 (1.92)** 
 0.86 (1.58)*** 
-0.06(-0.15) 
-0.16(-1.14 ) 
 0.02(1.96)** 
 0.04(2.08)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s own calculation 
Table 10  Comparing the robustness of panel regressions to alternative  
                definition of aid and policy. The effect of policy on aid effectiveness 
Variable Burnside and 
Dollar (OLS) 
Hansen and 
Tarp (GMM) 
Easterly et al. 
(OLS) 
Current study  
GMM 
 
Aid 
(Aid)2 
Policy 
Aid*Policy  
(Aid)2*Policy 
(Policy)2      
Lgdppc    
Ethnf        
Assassin  
Icrge        
Fin.dev       
Ethnfassas 
Inflation 
Budg.surp 
Openness 
N-observ-s 
 
 
0.49 (0.12) 
- 
0.78(0.20)** 
0.20(0.09)** 
-0.02(0.008)** 
- 
-0.56(0.56) 
-0.42(0.72) 
-0.45(0.26)* 
0.67(0.17)** 
0.016(0.014) 
0.80(0.44)* 
- 
- 
- 
275 
 
0.24(2.28) 
-0.75(2.31) 
- 
-0.006(0.22) 
- 
0.0002(0.26) 
0.001(0.13) 
0.002(0.26) 
-0.45(1.98) 
0.81(4.57) 
0.010(0.54) 
0.911(2.15) 
-0.013(2.22) 
0.096(2.36) 
0.016(2.67) 
211 
 
0.156(0.49) 
- 
0.86(4.12)* 
0.188(1.3) 
- 
- 
-0.78(-1.46) 
-0.4(-0.51) 
-0.42(-1.51) 
0.749(4.29)* 
0.011(0.77) 
0.79(1.72)*** 
- 
- 
- 
266 
 
0.59(1.96)** 
-1.66(-2.49)* 
1.74(3.83)* 
-15.32(-1.97)** 
38.12(2.41)** 
- 
-0.71(-3.58)* 
-0.00005(-0.60) 
-0.004(-1.14) 
0.0072(3.74)* 
-0.00035(-0.94) 
0.0001(1.94)** 
- 
- 
- 
163           
Sources:  Burnside and Dollar (2000),  Hansen and Tarp (2001), Easterly (2003) and  current study (2004).
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Table 12a  Country-summary statistics (two main indicators)* 
# Lower Income 
Countries** 
Per capita GDP growth(%-annum) Aid(% of 
GDP) 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
 
 
Algeria 
Bolivia 
Bostwana 
Cameroon 
Cote d’Ivore 
Dominic.Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Korea 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sri Lanka 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
2.8 
0.0 
7.5 
0.8 
-2.6 
2.7 
2.6 
3.8 
-0.3 
-4.7 
0.3 
-0.7 
-0.4 
0.1 
0.9 
2.1 
4.9 
1.3 
7.0 
-1.7 
-1.1 
4.6 
1.7 
-3.5 
1.5 
0.8 
2.8 
2.2 
0.9 
-0.2 
-0.4 
0.6 
2.9 
0.3 
5.2 
-0.2 
1.3 
-1.9 
-2.0 
-0.7 
 
0.8 
1.8 
5.1 
1.9 
0.9 
1.0 
2.3 
2.4 
1.9 
3.7 
7.1 
1.9 
3.7 
1.8 
2.2 
0.3 
0.4 
2.3 
0.2 
2.7 
5.7 
7.7 
0.9 
3.1 
5.4 
0.14 
0.8 
0.7 
0.4 
3.6 
1.7 
4.5 
1.2 
5.9 
0.2 
5.4 
0.9 
2.4 
4.8 
2.4 
Note: * denotes that the data are averages across all four-year periods, and ** indicates that initial per 
            capita GDP less than $1900 US (1985 US$) 
Source:  World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (2000)  
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  Table 12b  Country- summary statistics (two main indicators)* 
# Middle-income 
countries** 
Per capita GDP growth (%-
annum) 
Aid (% of GDP) 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
 
 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Gabon 
Guatemala 
Jamaica 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Peru 
Syria 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
 
 
2.8 
2.4 
2.1 
2.1 
1.5 
1.3 
0.6 
-2.9 
4.4 
1.4 
-0.7 
3.1 
0.6 
3.8 
1.2 
-0.5 
 
0.02 
0.03 
0.16 
0.12 
1.02 
            1.9 
            0.5 
1.42 
0.20 
0.02 
0.41 
1.86 
0.07 
0.33 
0.13 
0.01 
 
Note: * denotes that the data are averages across all four-year periods, and ** indicates that per capita GDP 
more than $1900 US (1985 US$) 
Source:  World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
 
 
Figure 2  Partial scatters of growth against new policy index  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Source:  Author’s own calculation 
gr
ow
th
policy
.325 2.154
 Source: Author’s own calculation 
-.036775
.06805
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Tests: 
1) The Breusch and Pagan LM test. 
The test results:   Chi2 = 5.27    with     Prob > Chi2 = (0.0217), 
So, from estimated test results we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that we can not use 
pooled OLS, as the variance of individual effects is not equal to zero. 
 
2)   The second test is the Hausman specification test in order to choose either the fixed effects or 
random effects models.  
Test: H0:   0ˆˆ =− REFE ββ
Test results: Chi2 (14) = 25.31  and  Prob > Chi2 = (0.0646) 
 
From the results, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the fixed effects estimation is 
better. The fixed effects model is inconsistent but more efficient than random effect.  
 
3)   Endogeneity test: Hence, for each suspected endogenous variable, Aid, (Aid)2 and Aid*Policy, I 
obtain the reduced form of residuals. Then, I test the joint significance of these residuals in the 
structural equation by using an F-test.  
An estimated test result is:  
 
F (3, 202) = 2.13  with  Prob > F = (0.0979),  
 
Here, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the suspected explanatory 
variables is endogenous. Following instrumental variables structure, a number of instruments are 
built. The number of endogenous variables is equal to the numbers reported in the previous 
studies. Using the Hausman test, I estimate whether or not the instruments are correlated with 
endogenous variables.  
The results of the test is as follows:  
 
Chi2 (16) = 3.06  with Prob > Chi2 = (0.9995) 
 
Here we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one instrument is correlated 
with endogenous variables. We run an F-test to find out the instruments, which correlate with 
endogenous variables, 
 39
  
F(11, 200) = 15.43  with  Prob > (0.0000),  
 
The test shows that, all the instruments are not correlated with endogenous variables except for the 
dummy for Egypt, which the existing studies do not mention.  Therefore, by excluding the dummy 
for Egypt we have new Hausman and F- test results:                   
 
Chi2 (15) = 43.83  with  Prob > Chi2 = (0.0000), 
        F(10, 201) = 17.06  with  Prob > (0.0000), 
 
So, overall the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected and I conclude that only 10 instruments are valid for 
the endogenous variables in the model regressions. 
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